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Abstract
Latin America  missed opportunities  for rapid resource-  innovate or even  take advantage  of technological
based growth that similarly  endowed countries-  advances abroad. Second,  the period of inward-looking
Australia,  Canada, Scandinavia-were  able to take  industrialization  discouraged innovation  and created a
advantage  of. Fundamental  to this poor performance  was  sector whose growth depended  on artificial monopoly
deficient  technological  adoption driven by two  factors.  rents rather than the quasi-rents arising from
First,  deficient national "learning"  or "innovative"  technological  adoption, and at the same time
capacity,  arising from  low investment  in human  capital  undermined  resource-intensive  sectors that had the
and scientific  infrastructure,  led  to weak ability to  potential for dynamic growth.
This paper-a product of the  Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-was prepared  as
a background paper  for the region's flagship report, From Natural  Resources to the Knowledge Economy (2001).  Copies
of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Patricia
Soto,  room 18-018,  telephone 202-473-7892,  fax 202-522-7528,  email  address psoto@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research
Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
wmaloney@worldbank.org.  December 2002.  (40 pages)
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The  20'h  century  offered  opportunities  for rapid  resource-based  growth that Latin
America  systematically  missed.  Even  if it were  clear that  on  average  natural  resource
abundant countries have experienced  slower growth,  the more interesting question is why
some  - Australia,  Canada  and the  nations  of Scandinavia-developed  successfully  while
others did not. '  This paper argues that the causes of Latin America's  underperformance
and  acute  sense of dependency  can  be found  in barriers  to  technological  adoption  and
innovation  with  deep  historical  roots.  The  most  important  was  and  remains  deficient
national  "learning  capacity",  exacerbated  in  the  post  war  period  by  the  perverse
incentives of  inward looking development  policies.
Concerns  that  resource-based  sectors  intrinsically  lack  dynamism  have  probably
been  exaggerated.2 Even  in Prebisch's  era,  future  Nobel  Prize  winner  Douglass  North
(1955  p.252)  argued  that  "the  contention  that  regions  must  industrialize  in  order  to
continue  to  grow  ...  [is]  based  on  some  fundamental  misconceptions;"  and  the  pioneer
trade  economist  Jacob  Viner  argued  that  "There  are  no  inherent  advantages  of
manufacturing  over  agriculture"  (Viner,  1952  p.  72).  His  claim  is  supported  by
estimates  that  Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  growth,  the  dominant  explanation  of
differences  in the growth of GDP/capita, 3 was roughly twice  as high  in agriculture  as in
manufacturing  globally  from  1967 to  1992.4  Bl6mstrom  and  Kokko  (2001)  argue that
forestry  will  remain a dynamic  sector  in Sweden  and  Finland, where  rapid productivity
growth ensures competitiveness relative to emerging  low-wage producers. Wright (2001),
drawing on the early US and Australian cases, argues that the stock of minerals is, to an
important  degree,  endogenous  and  major  increases  in  productivity  can  be  realized  in
discovery  and exploitation.  More generally, the literature  is clear that these  development
successes based their growth  on natural resources  and, by Leamer's  measure of resource
abundance, several still do (See figure  1).5
'  An emerging literature  (see, for example  Sachs and Warner 2001)  has  argued that resource abundance  is
associated  with slower  growth on  average.  Though  this paper will  not attempt  to resolve  this debate,  a
couple cautionary points are worth making. First, the time period where the data permit reasonable analysis
covers  25 years at the end of the  20t'  century.  This is probably not a representative  period,  including as it
does  the  debt crisis  (see  Rigobon  and  Manzano  2001)  and  structural  reforms,  and  as  suggested  by  the
regressions  here,  probably cannot be extrapolated  to earlier eras.  Second,  the finding may  not be  robust to
using  different  measures  of  resource  abundance,  including  the  Leamer  measure  used  here.  Third,  it  is
important  to know whether underperformance  is intrinsic  to NR based sectors, or a non-essential  correlate,
such  as destructive political economy  issues (See Auty  2001).  See also fn  6.
2  See,  of course,  Prebisch,  but  also  more  recently  Matsuyama  (1991),  Sachs  and  Warner  (2001),  and
Rodriguez  and Rodrik (1999)
3See Parente and Prescott (2000),  Dollar and Wolff (1997),  Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare  1996.
4Martin  and Mitra (2001).  See  also Bernard  and Jones (1996),  Lewis, Martin,  and Savage  (1988),  Martin
and Warr (1993).
5See  Irwin  (2000) for  the US;  Innis  (1933) and Watkins  (1963) for Canada;  Wright 2001, Czelusta  2001
for Australia;  Blomstrom  and  Kokko  (2001)  and  Blomstrom  and  Meller  (1987)  for Scandinavia.  Latin
1Latin America  seemed unable to follow their lead.  As a crude summary,  regressing
Maddison's  (1994)  well-known  growth  data  from  1820-1989  (table  la)  on  Leamer's
measure  of resource  abundance  suggests  a positive growth  impact  of  resources  from
1820-1950,  but that Latin America's  especially poor performance  in the post-war period
is  responsible  for  the  apparent  "resource  curse"  afflicting  that  era.6 This
underperformance  is  illustrated  more  starkly  by  several  examples  at  the  micro  level.
Despite  being  far  from  the  innovation  frontier,  and  hence  with  the  potential  to  play
"catch-up,"  the growth of total  factor productivity  in Latin America  in both  agriculture
and manufacturing  perversely  lags  that  of  the  countries  at  the technological  frontier
(Mitra  and  Martin  2001,  and Figure 2).  The  1944 Haig  technical  assistance  mission to
Chile revealed  the "indisputable  truth that  an adequate  management  of our forests could
become the basis for a great industry  of forest products,"  yet nothing remotely similar to
the  dynamic  Scandinavian  experience  appeared  in  this  country  until  the  late  1970s.7
Wright  (2001)  categorizes  Latin  American  countries  as  traditional  mineral
"underachievers,"  and  massive  discoveries  of deposits  throughout  the  region  in  recent
years  confirn  his  view.8  More  emblematically,  we  could  ask  why  a  small  antipodal
dependency,  Australia,  would  discover  La Escondida, Chile's  largest  copper  mine  a
century after Chile's once dominant native industry had all but vanished.
Central  to every example are the foregone opportunities to exploit the global stock
of  knowledge  to  increase  productivity  growth  and  create,  or  perpetuate,  dynamic
industries  as  the  Nordic  and  the East  Asian  miracles  have done (Baumol,  Nelson,  and
Wolff  1994,  Amsden  and Hikino  1994).  Or, to paraphrase  Di Tella's  (1985) broader
historical  view,  the region  proved unable  to move  beyond  a state of exploiting  the pure
rents of a frontier or extraction of mineral  riches, and beyond "collusive rents" offered by
state-sanctioned  or otherwise imposed monopoly, to tap the "unlimited source of growth"
found in exploiting the quasi-rents of innovation.9
America  also offers  its  success stories:  Monterrey  Mexico,  Medallin  Colombia,  and Sao Paolo,  Brazil  all
grew to become dynamic industrial centers based on mining and in the later two cases, coffee.
Leamer's  measure of resource abundance,  net exports per worker is broadly supported by the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework.  The greater temporal  scope comes at a high cost in terms of available control  variables
used in other studies and the regressions must be treated  as suggestive  only. Further, both the lack of any
temporal variation  in our natural resource and the knowledge  variables proscribe any meaningful panel
treatment of the data. This implies that more sophisticated approaches,  such as suggested by Arellano  and
Bond, (1991)  that  would address important issues of unobserved heterogeneity  correlated  with regressors,
or the endogeneity  of both the initial income or investment variables  cannot be employed. (See Lederman
and Maloney 2002 for a partial review).
7 Cited in Maloney (1997, p. 25).
8 Baer (2001)  notes how the recent application of satellite technology  has led to vastly expanded  estimates
of mining  potential  in Brazil relative  to the stock,  confidently seen  as  fixed in  the  1960s. Mining  exports
doubled  between  1992  and  1999  in Peru,  making  it  the  world's  second  larger  silver,  bismuth,  and  tin
producer, sixth in copper, and eighth in gold; but Wright (2001)  argues that this is still far below potential.
Referring  to the closing of the Argentine frontier, he argues:  'This  kind of area of new settlement was
bound to see its rates of growth falter after initial colonization. Argentina behaved,  to some extent,  in this
fairly predictable fashion.  But the same was not true for the other countries. It must be acknowledged  that
the ability of the United States, Canada and Australia to continue a process  of vigorous growth even at the
end of the expansion of the frontier has been a most extraordinary  feat, and one that could not be take for
granted....  At that point the successful  cases were able to move to a quasi-rent based stage-early  for the
2This  article  argues  that  this  failure  has  two  central,  although  by  no  means
exhaustive,  explanations.  The  first  is  a deficient  national  "innovative"  or  "learning"
capacity:  the human capital  and networks of institutions that  facilitate  the adoption  and
creation  of new  technologies.'0 Wright  (1999 p.  308)  argues  that the U.S.  success  in
mining  "was fundamentally  a collective learning  phenomenon"  incarnated in intellectual
networks  linking  world  class  mining  universities,  and  both  government  and  private
research,  features  also  under  girding  Australia's  current  success  and  absent  in  the
underachievers.  Blomstrom and Kokko  (2001  p. 34) argue  that knowledge  networks, or
clusters  of  universities  and  private  and  public  think  tanks,  are  the  key  to  further
productivity  growth  and  development  of  new  products  and  are  "perhaps  the  main
strategic and competitive  asset of the Swedish forest industry."  Such knowledge clusters,
by  virtue  of  preparing  firms  to  identify  and  exploit  unforeseeable  technological
opportunities,  also  make  possible  apparently  discontinuous jumps  such  as  Nokia  made
from  excellence  in  forestry  (Nokia  was  the  site  of  Finland's  earliest  pulp  mill)  to
leadership in telecommunications.
The  second  consists  of  the  myriad  barriers  to  technological  adoption  usually
associated  with  artificially  created  monopoly  power.  Hirschman  (1958  p  57)  early  on
argued that in an uncompetitive  situation such  as the one posed by the guild system,  "an
innovation  in producing  a given commodity  could  only be introduced  by someone  who
was already  engaged  in its production  by the  old process....  [T]his fact would,  in itself,
militate  against many  innovations that might render painfully  acquired skills useless and
valuable  equipment obsolete...."  Parente  and Prescott's (2000)  simulations  suggest  that
costs  in a dynamic context of such barriers  to new entry far exceeds the few percentage
point differences  in GDP accounted  for by  the Harberger  triangles  of traditional  static
models.  Anti-competitive  forces  that discourage  innovation  or inhibit entry can take the
form of guilds,  labor  unions,  concentrated  credit  markets  that  only  lend  to insiders,
explicit  trade  barriers  that  impede  knowledge  spillovers  from trade  interactions  (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin  1997,  Grossman  and Helpman  1991),  or barriers  to FDI.  All of these
were exacerbated by the prolonged turning inward of the ISI period.
The  impact of  both  factors  can  be  formalized  by hijacking  Howitt  and  Mayer's
(2001)  "convergence  club"  model  that  offers  an  explanation  for  how  the  scientific
revolution led to large  global income inequalities,  and applying it to the present question
of  why  similarly  endowed  countries  perform  so  differently.  In  the  face  of  new
technological  shocks,  countries  with high  "innovation-effective"  (relative  to  the current
level  of technological  advance)  human  capital,  which  I  construe  broadly  to  include
knowledge  clusters,  will  be  able  to create  further  new  technologies;  those  with  lower
stocks of human capital  will "implement"  or adopt;  and those with even lower levels of
most successful of all, the United States, less so for Canada and Australia, and rather later for Argentina;
further development for the United States and Canada  was more clearly  based on innovation and less so in
Australia. For Argentina  it arose exclusively from collusive quasi-rents.  To the extent that development
was based on innovation,  these countries were  switching to an alternative  and unlimited source of growth.
To the extent that it was based on collusion, it opened up a limited, alternative path" (Di Tella 1985, p. 51).
to See Stern,  Porter, and Furman (2000), Romer (1990), Nelson and Wright (1992)
3human capital  will  not be able to adopt and  will stagnate.  Though  in the steady state the
first  two  groups  of  countries  grow  at  the  same  rate,  driven  by  the  arrival  of  new
technological  advance,  the progress  to their higher  steady-state income  levels will  cause
innovators to appear to grow faster.
Three  additional  findings of their model  are  salient to the discussion of rest of the
article.  First,  once  a  leading economy  introduces  the institutions  supporting  science,
lagging economies  have  only  a finite window  of opportunity  in which  to do so as well,
after  which  they  remain  trapped  in  an  implementation  equilibrium  or worse.  Second,
countries  can  slip  out  of the  better  equilibria  if their  innovation-effective  knowledge
infrastructure does not keep pace with technological progress.
Third,  policies  that  either  promote  or  impede  innovation,  are  influential  in
determining in which equilibrium  the country finds itself.  The inward looking policies  of
the  post-war  period  merit  special  focus  in  this  respect.  On the  one hand,  the  extreme
negative rates of protection found in many traditional sectors during the ISI period were a
clear  disincentive  to  innovation.  But  the  excessive  protection  in  the  manufacturing
sectors may have the same effect by reducing the need to innovate  to compete."
As  a  crude  test  of the  plausibility  of this  view,  table  lb adds  to  the  post  WWII
regressions  a  "knowledge  index"  (see  technical  appendix)  comprising  measures  of
scientists  per  capita,  R&D  expenditure  and  patent  applications,  Sachs  and  Warner's
(2001) measure of trade openness,  and the investment rate. The first two columns use the
two pooled  cohorts  of the  post-1950  Maddison  data,  and  the last two  columns  use  the
single cross-section of  Sachs'  and Warner's  data.  Both data tell very  similar stories. The
new  variables  appear  to  capture  the  effect  of the  Latin  America  dummy  appearing  in
columns  la and 2a and contribute in the predicted ways: more open economies and those
with  a more developed  "knowledge  infrastructure"  grow  faster.  In neither  data set does
the measure of resource abundance  enter significantly.
The  next  sections  attempt  to  complement  such  overworked  cross-country
regressions  by a historical comparison of several  Latin American countries  with a group
of  "beta"  countries  that  have  had  more  success  with  resource-based  growth.  This
approach  has  two  attractions.  First,  it  presents  what  students  of these  countries  have
identified  as  critical  elements  of success  or  failure.  Second,  it  establishes  that  Latin
America  was  not sui generis in  its concerns  about dependency,  its degree  of suffering
during  the Great  Depression,  or,  in fact,  in  adopting the  inward-looking  policies  it did.
But  the  region's  response  lies  at  the  extreme  end  of a continuum  that extends  through
Canada  and  Australia  to  Sweden  at the  most  successful  terminus.  Acknowledging  the
similarities  with more  successful countries  is vital since it prevents us from isolating the
region  as  some  sort  of rare  and  unredeemable  case  operating  under  separate  economic
laws.  Indeed  the  persistent  Australian  interest  in  Argentina  stems  precisely  from  a
perceived  kinship  and a  desire  to avoid  its fate.  By the same  logic,  there  was probably
1"  Recent literature  by Aghion et.  al. (2000, 2002) stresses that for low levels of competition,  the traditional
Shumpeterian effect that reducing rents decreases  innovation is outweighed  by the incentive  to innovate to
escape competition from rivals.
4nothing preordained  about the disappointments of the last half of the twentieth century-
different policies could have led to better outcomes.
HI. Deficient National LearningtInnovation Capacity?
Harvard  historian David Landes (1998)  in his encyclopedic  Wealth and Poverty of
Nations sees  the  divergence  of  the  two  paths  of  Latin  America  and  Scandinavia  as
stemming  from  the  differing  reactions  of  northern  and  southern  Europe  to  the
phenomenon  of British industrialization.  The  literature is uniform that Scandinavia  was
poor at the beginning  of the  nineteenth  century,  but had  laid the  groundwork for rapid
growth.  Scandinavians enjoyed high levels of literacy and excellent higher education, and
Landes  argues  that  they  were  "equal  partners  in  Europe's  intellectual  and  scientific
community....  They  also  operated  in  an  atmosphere  of  political  stability  and  public
order....  Property rights were secure;  the peasantry  was largely free; and life was a long
stretch of somber hard work broken intermittently by huge bouts of drinking and seasonal
sunshine..."(pp.  248-252).
To this  depiction  Landes  offers  the  dramatic  counterexample  of Mediterranean
Europe,  in  particular  of  Italy,  Spain,  and Portugal,  hurt  by  political  instability  and  a
religious  and  intellectual  intolerance  with  roots  in  the  reconquista  and  counter-
reformation.  Further, Spain in the eighteenth  century was a resource-rich nation that used
its fantastic returns from silver and gold mines in the New World to purchase all that was
needed,  thus  developing  a rentier mentality  rather  than  that  of a  nation  of  hands-on
tinkerers  such  as appeared  in Britain,  the United  States,  and Scandinavia.  This cultural
Dutch Disease was exported wholesale to the New World.
There  is no shortage  of Latin  American  observers  disposed to  self-flagellation  far
more severe  than Landes'  critique.  As examples,  Encina (1911)  in Nuestra Inferioridad
Economica and Pinto (1959) in Chile, Un Caso de Dessarollo  Frustrado  are only the best
read  of a  line of critics  of aristocratic  dandyism  and  indolence  at the  root  of Chile's
stagnation and dependence on foreigners.12 Nor, in the light of extraordinary  expenditures
12  Monteon  (1982)  summarizes the underlying critique  that "The economic ideal of the nineteenth  century
remained that of a rentier-someone  who makes his fortune in one quick speculation and thereafter lives on
land rents or some other long term yield. Domingo Sarmiento in 1842 referred to the effect of this  ideal on
native  entrepreneurs:  southern  hacendados  and northern  mine-owners  left  their "affaires"  in the  hands of
supervisors and moved to Santiago where they "tried to imitate or rather parody the European Aristocracy"
(Monteon  1982,  p  14). This critique  finds  an  even earlier expression  in Juan Jose  Santa Cruz,  who in his
Reflections on the Economic State of Chile in 1791saw the potential with a small outlay  of displacing the
British fishing  and whaling activity off the Chilean coast. But he lamented  the introduction into the Colony
of  "luxury,  ostentation  and  expensive  tastes"  and  saw  no  permanent  improvement  in  the  economic
conditions  of  Chile  as  possible  as  long  as  the  population  remained  improvident  and  susceptible  to
sumptuous living (Will  1957,  p. 57). The theme again recurs in Marcial Gonzalez  1874 speech "Luxury our
Enemy" where  he argued that the cloths, jewels,  coaches, and statues  exceed those found anywhere else in
America. (Reference  in Monteon).  Pinto (1959, p.75) cites the historian Francisco Encina:  ...If half of what
we  have  wasted  in  the  last  40  years  or  invested  in  luxury  we  had  applied  to  buying  Nitrate  mining
machinery  or  to setting up the copper industry, to irrigating  our fields  ...  the position of Chile in America
5on  luxury  goods,  are  they  receptive  to  savings  shortfalls  as  unavoidable  binding
constraints on growth.'3
But  there  must  be  some  tempering  of  the  condemnation  of  the  entrepreneurial
mettle of the Chilean  elite,  and that of the region  more generally.  Pinto is  also clear that
the  elimination  of  Spanish  restrictions  on  trade  caused  Chilean  exports  to  boom
immediately  after,  and this was  the case throughout  the continent.  Chilean entrepreneurs
were  the  second  largest  presence  in  Peru's  nitrate  fields,  ahead  of  the  British,  and
pioneered  copper  mining  in their  home  country.  When  the  price  of copper  rose  in the
mid-nineteenth  century,  production  by Chileans  increased  four-fold  from 1844-1860.  In
response  to  increased  demand  rising  from  the  Gold rushes  in California  and  Australia,
Chilean  wheat  exports  rose  ten-fold  in value  during  1848-1850.14  Southern  hacendados
borrowed  heavily  to  clear  lands  to  expand  acreage  three-fold  from  1850  to  1870
(Conning  2001). Cariola and Sunkel  (1985)  argue that the early nitrate economy  was not
merely  an  enclave  in  the  Norte  Grande,  but  elicited  strong  response  from  Chilean
entrepreneurs throughout the economy.  In general, local talent proved  very responsive  in
certain  non-technical  sectors  and  would  earn  global acclaim  across  history:  two Nobel
prizes  in  literature,  a  major  surrealist/abstract  expressionist  painter,  and  first-class
musicians.
In  fact,  Encina's  lament was  precisely  that Chile  was  losing the dynamism  that  it
once had and this he partly attributes  to a dearth of technical education  that would permit
staying  at  the  forefront  of  development.  Or  to  borrow  Howitt  and  Mayer's  (2001)
formalization,  Chile's  innovation-effective  human  capital  (relative  to  the  technological
frontier)  depreciated  below  the  critical  level  for  innovation  and  even  for  effective
adoption.  The disappointing  growth  of Latin  America  had  more  to do  with  a  lack  of
supporting  infrastructure  for  learning  and  innovation  that  would  enable  local
would today  be different.'  The  propensity  to save  and invest was not,  then,  the most striking virtue of our
community."
13Though  Pinto (1959,  p.  57)  acknowledges  some,  although  almost  certainly  not  enough,  of a  role  for
corruption,  "what was decisive was the absence of local individuals and groups interested  in developing, on
their own,  the nitrate riches."  In fact,  although Chilean capital  finance  was very  important, the British had
dominated  the  nitrates  industry  in  Peru  and  Bolivia  and  had  substantial  marketing  networks.  This  made
them  the natural  agents  to continue  mining  once  these lands  were taken  by Chile.  Monteon  (1982)  also
argues  that the  global condemnation  of Chile's  imperialism  may have  induced  a  strategy of dividing the
world  comnmunity  by offering Britain  a sweet deal.  In any case,  it appears  that the British were aware of a
government  plan  to  allocate  ownership  on  the  basis  of  who  owned  the  Peruvian  titles.  This  inside
information  allowed  them  to purchase  shares at a discount  and emerge as owners.  A question does emerge
as to why Chilean capital  was  so willing to sell  and to why it did not protest more after the fact. One  of the
earlier  Chilean  nitrate  pioneers,  Jose  Santos  Ossa,  petitioned  that,  given  this  dearth  of  local
entrepreneurship,  the  government  take  over  the job of mining;  but the  minister of the interior  replied  that
the state would  be  corrupted  by  such  an  undertaking  and that it was better  to leave it to private  interests,
implying,  foreign capital.  This may  have been  due  as  much  to  an  embrace of classical  liberal  economic
values  during  the period  as  much as  any Spanish rentier hangover,  but Pinto  seems less  convinced.  "The
decision  of the  managing  groups of the  country to  'live from the rents'  of the industry"(Monteon  1956,  p.
56)  and not play the Schumpeterian  entrepreneurial  midwife  would  cost the  country,  not only  in  income
foregone,  but also  in  expertise  and  dynamism  that Pinto argues  let foreigners  dominate  in  every  field of
domestic endeavor.
14  Encina, Historia  de Chile Xm, p. 486, cited in Will (1957).
6entrepreneurs  to  innovate  and  hence  stay  abreast  of  competition  than  any  rentier
temperament  inherited from  Spain.15 The next sections  focus on  weaknesses  in literacy
and technical education as particularly important.
The Foundation  of Technical  Absorptive Capacity: Literacy
Recent  thinking  suggests  that  Latin  America's  persistent  wealth  inequality  may
have  had  a role  to play  in slowing  the  region's  ability to  adopt  foreign  technologies.'6
Engerman,  Haber,  and  Sokoloff  (2000)  argue  that  the  period  of  sustained  economic
growth during the eighteenth  and early nineteenth  centuries  that distinguished the United
States  and Canada  from the other New  World economies  was  fundamentally  due to the
patterns of settlement and crops that led to a relative unequal distribution of income in the
slower  growing  areas.  This  concentration  preserved  the  political  influence  of  the
advantaged  elites  and  led to the marginalization  of much of the population  as measured
by  lower  access  to the  franchise,  natural  resources,  financial  institutions,  and  property
rights, as well as primary schooling.
The  marginalization  in  education  may  have  been  particularly  important.  The
concerns  with  social  control,  extreme  inequality  of income,  weak  public  finance,  and
perhaps an intellectual  commitment to a small state, all led to dramatically  smaller efforts
in  Latin  America  toward  universal  education  than  the  successful  natural  resource
exporters made. As figure 3 suggests, by 1870 more than 70 percent of the population age
10 or above in Australia,  the United States, Canada, and Sweden was literate, three times
the percentage  in Argentina,  Chile, Costa Rica,  and Cuba,  and four times the percentage
in Brazil  and Mexico.  Latin  America progressed  unevenly  toward these  levels over the
next half  century.  By  1925,  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Chile,  and Costa  Rica  would  attain
literacy  rates  of  over  66  percent,  while  Mexico,  Brazil,  Venezuela,  Peru,  Colombia,
Bolivia, Guatemala,  and Honduras  would hover at 30 percent until much  later (Mariscal
and Sokoloff 2000).
As Engerman  and Sokoloff (1997, p. 287) note, this is particularly important given
that early industrialization  reflected the cumulative impact of incremental  advances made
by individuals  throughout the economy,  rather than being driven by progress in a single
15  Pushing the argument further,  if investment was constrained  by human capital,  it may have been rational
to be purely rentiers.
16  The  Scandinavian  countries  did  not  start  with  an  egalitarian  tabula rasa. In  the  eighteenth  century,
Danish land was in the hands of a few thousand families on large estates tilled by serfs,  and only 23 percent
of rural  households owned  land in Finland.  But  as Blomstrom and Meller  [1991a  , p. 6] argue,  "what  laid
the foundation  for the Scandinavian  transformation to modern  wealthy societies  were the agrarian reforms"
that created small-  and medium-size  privately owned farms,  and  which  ranged in timing from Denmark's
precocious  beginnings in 1788 to Norway and Sweden's  efforts in the 1850s and Finland's of the 1920s. As
with  the  relatively  equal  distribution  of land  in  Canada  (Watkins,  1963  and  Armstrong,  1985)  and  the
United  States,  Blomstrom  and  Kokko  (2001)  argue  that  "it  is  hardly  possible  to  over-emphasize  the
importance  of the improvement  in  agricultural  productivity  for Swedish industrialization  which facilitated
transfer  of  labor  and  made  possible  exports  that  generated  capital  for  investment  in  forestry  and
manufacturing  in addition to providing a local market."
7industry or the actions  of a narrow elite. As one manifestation  critical to the development
of innovation, they note that the greater equality in human capital accounted partially for
the high  rates of invention  in  the United  States overall.  They also  argue that "the more
general  concern with the opportunities for extracting  returns from inventions contributed
to a patent  system  which  was  probably,  at the  time,  the most favorable  in the  world to
common people.  This stands  in stark contrast  to Mexico  and Brazil, where  patents  were
restricted  by costs and  procedures  to the wealthy  or influential,  and where  the rights  to
organize corporations  and financial  institutions were granted  sparingly, largely to protect
the value of rights already held by powerful interests."
Bl6mstrom  and  Kokko  (2001)  argue  that  in  Sweden,  the  introduction  of  a
mandatory school  system in  1842 and  emphasis on  literacy and  numeracy  was essential
for  the  ability  of  individuals  and  firms  to  learn  and  adopt  new  technologies:  much
elementary  learning  and  technology  transfer  was  based  on  written  instructions  like
blueprints  and  handbooks.  This  also  suggests  that  the  extensive  literature  comparing
Argentina and Australia may be missing a critical point. Despite a strong feeling of "there
but for the grace of God go we"  on the part of Australian authors, it is very clear that, in
the  mid-nineteenth  century,  Australia  was  far  closer  to  the  industrialized  countries  in
levels of literacy; this,  in a country  that until the  1840s was a penal  colony of the United
Kingdom.  The story of the global conglomerate  Broken Hill Proprietary  Company, LTD
(BHP),  started by a boundary rider on a sheep station, suggests the importance of a broad
base of literate everymen to run with ideas and enjoy supporting institutions.
Technical Education:  The Critical  Lag
A  central  theme  of  Blomstrom  and  Kokko's  account  of  the  Swedish  growth
experience  is  the  early  abundance  of  high-level  human  capital-the  "impoverished
sophisticate"  Sandberg  (1979)  called  it. The Universities  in Uppsala and Lund date from
the fifteenth and seventeenth  centuries  and technical schools were established in the early
1820s.  Examples  of other institutions  are the  Swedish Academy  of Science,  founded  in
1739,  and  the  Swedish  Ironmaster's  Association  (1747)  which  published  a  mining
science journal beginning in  1817 and financed foreign-study trips for Swedish engineers
and  scientists.  New  engineering  workshops,  established  for construction of iron bridges
and  lock  gates  of the  Gota  canal,  served  as  training  centers.  Sweden  possessed  the
fundamentals of a modern engineering  industry by about  1850 (Ahlstr6m  1992) and was
exporting  engineers  by  1900.  In  the  same  year,  serious  research  in  chemistry  was
undertaken  at  the  University  of Oslo  that  would  lay  the  foundation  for  the  dominant
fertilizer, electrochemical,  and electrometallurgical  industries  in Norway.17 As in Britain
and  the  United  States,  Scandinavian  mechanization  was  a  slow  process  that  implied
ongoing  accumulation  of know-how,  continuous  interaction  with the outside  world,  and
extraordinary  contributions  at  the  technological  frontier.'8 The  exceptional  long-run
17 Hveem (1991).
'8Very early on, for example,  Scandinavia was exporting  know-how in the form of its own emigres  toward
tsarist  Russia,  where  Alfred  Nobel  was  one  of  the  pioneers  of  the  infant  petroleum  industry.  To  a
significant  extent the  expansion  of manufacturing  during  the  first  decades  of the twentieth  century  was
8performance  of  Swedish  firms  established  during  this  period,  Blomstrom  and  Kokko
(2001, p.  10) note, "has been based  on the ability of Swedish industry to create, adapt and
disseminate new technologies."
By contrast,  the colonial  period  in Latin  America  enforced  a negative  intellectual
bias  in many  ways  that exactly  discouraged  the adoption  of foreign  innovations.  Many
countries had  a local  franchise of the Inquisition which in Colombia  is memorialized for,
among other things, having contributed  to the "suffocation  of the spirit of creativity and
investigation."' 9 Largely for reasons of political control, the icon of intellectual discourse,
the printing press, was banned in Brazil until 1809 (Baer 2001). The Spanish  crown kept
out non-Spanish and non-Catholic  businessmen,  traders, and craftsmen and thus deprived
the New World of important skills and knowledge.
Further, the nature of education  in Latin America was less technical than that found
in  Scandinavia  or  the  former  English  colonies.  Spanish  higher  education  was  largely
religiously  based  and  focused  on  law,  philosophy,  and  theology,  and  somewhat  less
respectably,  medicine,  and  this  pattern  was  replicated  in  the  colonies.  The  Spanish
enlightenment  after  1750  saw  the  establishment  of groups  of autonomous  sociedaded
economicas  that  sought  to  diffuse  technology  from  abroad  and  establish  libraries
throughout  the country,  as well  as some  Royal Societies  emphasizing  applied  science.
But Spain began training engineers seriously only in the 1850s, and by 1867 had only one
functioning Escuela de Ingenieros  Industriales, located in Barcelona.
Latin America for the most part lagged  behind Spain and Portugal in developing  a
technical  class.  In  both  Chile  and  Colombia  specific  royal  initiatives  gave  the  initial
impetus  to  scientific  inquiry  in  the  last  decades  of colonization.2'  However,  as  Will
(1957,  p.  17)  documents  for  Chile,  "With  the  exception  of  the  inadequate  facilities
provided by a few religious organizations,  there did not exist  ...  before the middle of the
eighteenth  century  an institution  capable  of furnishing the  youth of the colony  with the
barest  essentials  of  a  secular  education."  Similar  stories  for  developments  in  the
nineteenth  century  are  found  throughout  the  region:22 recurring  political  instability
silenced  prominent  scientists  and  undermined  fledgling  universities;  fiscal  weakness
prevent  consistent  financing  of  the  sciences;  and  the  unreliable  demand  for  local
engineers  prevented  the  career  from  being  lucrative,  let  alone socially  respectable.  An
based on Swedish  innovations:  steam turbines,  centrifugal  separators, ball bearings,  the adjustable  spanner,
the safety match,  air compressors,  automatic  lighthouse  technique, various  types of precision  instruments,
techniques  for precision  measurements,  and  so  forth  (Lindbeck  1974,  p  5).  The great companies  known
today  were  built on innovations  in these  areas.  Ericson  (founded  in  1876)  thrived  on the telephone,  Alfa
Laval  (1879)  on  the  separator;  ASEA  (1890)  on  electrical  equipment;  and  SKF  (1907)  on  bearings
(Amsden and Hikino (1994)
19 Memorial plaque at the  Casa de la Inquisicion  in Cartegena de las Indias, Colombia.
20 Riera i Tudbols  (1993).
21  See Will (1957)  for Chile;  Safford (1976) for Colombia and Lopez Soria (1999) for Peru. Despite having
one of the  oldest universities  in  Latin America,  Peru  would fail twice,  once  in  1852-53 with  the Escuela
Central  de Ingenieros  Civiles  and  again  in  1875  with  the  Escuela  de  Minas,  in  establishing  technical
education.  They would succeed in  1876 by creating the Escuela de Ingenieros Civiles.
22  See Safford  (1976)  for Colombia,  Villalobos  (1990)  and Greve  (1938)  for Chile,  and  Baer (1969)  for
Brazil.
9important exception appears in Mexico where the precursor to the Universidad  Nacional,
the  Real Seminario de Mineria, was  founded  in  1792  and taught  higher  mathematics,
physics,  chemistry,  topography,  dynamics,  and  hydraulics.  Mexico  was  the  primary
exporter of technical  knowledge on the continent,  and occupied the Vice  Presidency of
the World Mining Association  at the turn  of the  nineteenth  century.23 Unfortunately,  as
Cardenas  (1997)  makes  clear,  Mexico was  not completely  exceptional.  The struggle for
independence  had  devastating  effects  on the  mining  sector-martyred  scientist-patriots,
capital flight, flooding of mines, and a roughly  50 percent fall in output that took almost
70 years to reverse, causing a lost half century of Mexican growth.
The low supply of engineers  was in part driven by the limited and unstable demand
for them;  and  arguably,  resource-based  industries  were  catalysts  pushing  countries  to
reach better innovation equilibria.  In Chile, Colombia, Mexico,  Australia, and the United
States,  mining  institutes  were  the  kernels  of  technical  schools  and  later  important
universities.  Interestingly,  railroads  may  have  played  a  similar  role.  As  Safford  (1976)
makes  clear,  troubled  politics  and  public  finances  that  frequently  stalled  railway
construction  undermined the momentum of the engineering profession in Colombia.
A corps of locally trained engineers  emerged by the end of the nineteenth century
in  many  countries,  but this  may  have been  too little  and  too  late.  As table  3 suggests,
Australia  had at least  5  times  the numbers  of Chile or Colombia  in  1920  and Meredith
(1995)  argues that by  1926,  Australia had  27 times more graduates  of technical  schools
per capita  than Argentina,  perhaps the most educated country  in  Latin America.  Sweden
had almost  10 times the density of engineers  as Colombia or Chile and to repeat,  in this
period Scandinavia  was exporting engineers  innovating at the frontier. The persistence of
this deficit, measured  as the percentage  of architects  and engineers per worker continued
into  the  1960s:  Sweden  (5.03),  Finland  (2.52),  and  Denmark  (1.03)  had  the  highest
densities,  compared  to the  lows of Argentina  (0.55),  Chile  (0.7),  Educator  (0.18),  and
24 Uruguay  (0.42).  Further,  it is  not clear how  good  the  quality  of the  Latin  American
product  was.  At the  end  of the  nineteenth  century  in  both  Colombia  and Chile,  local
engineers  complained  that  the  government  and  private  firms  preferred  to  import
engineers  from France or the United States even for fairly straightforward tasks.
Does This Really Matter?
The U.S.,  Scandinavian,  and Australian  literature  strongly  supports the idea that
such  technical capacity,  and more  generally the ability  to learn  from abroad,  was critical
to  accessing  technological  progress  abroad  and  in  the  long  run,  the  establishment  of
knowledge clusters.  And there are some provocative examples from Latin America.
Perhaps  the first bit of evidence is the extraordinary  dependence  on immigrants as
innovators  and  entrepreneurs  in  new  sectors.  Industrialization  in  Mexico  in  the  late
nineteenth  century  would  be  almost  entirely  undertaken  by  the  resident  foreigners
23 I'm grateful to Rodrigo  Garcia Verdu of the Banco de Mexico for calling the Mexican case to my
attention.  http://ingenieria/unam.mx/historia/historiallb.html
24 OECD (1969).
10(Hansen  1971).  Using  machinery  from their  homeland,  the  French  started  the  textile
industries  in  Veracruz  and Puebla  (Buffington  and  French  1999),  and  foreigners  also
started Mexico's  first iron and steel plant  in  1903,  the Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de
Monterrey,  which  would  build  on  the  region's  ore  deposits  and  anchor  its  industrial
development.  Hansen  argues  that  there  were  entrepreneurial  spillover  effects that drew
many Mexicans into the capitalist ranks, but the initial impulse came from foreigners.
Collier and Sater (1996) also note the influence of immigrants in introducing new
industry and  technologies  in Chile.  Immigrants  set up many of the industrial  enterprises
of  the  1860s  and  1870s:  36  of  the  46  dressmakers  counted  in  1854  were  French;
Americans  installed  the flourmills;  Americans  and British  built the railroads.  Loveman
(1979,  p.  193)  notes  that the list of officers  and members  of the executive  committee of
SOFOFA,  the  principal  organization  of  industrialists,  showed  the  disproportionate
influence of immigrants:  "Only three  Spanish  surnames  accompanied  those of the other
members of the directorate:  Edwards, Subercasseaux,  Hillman,  Tupper,  Tiffou, Mitchell,
Gabler, Lanz, Klein, Muzard, Lyon, Bernstein, Crichton, Osthous, Stuven."
Fogarty  (1985)  tells  a  similar  story  for  the  development  of  beef,  Argentina's
"super  staple,"  wherein  a  small  group  of hacendados,  recently  arrived  from  Europe,
formed the Sociedad  Rural Argentina in  1866. This group spearheaded  the transformation
of  the  pampas  improving  the  quality  of livestock,  pastures,  and  methods  of  animal
husbandry  necessary  to  take  over  the  U.S.  position  as  principal  exporter  of cattle  to
Europe by WWI, with dramatic forward and backward linkages throughout the economy.
Fogarty also notes that while in the United States, Canada, and Australia, railroads  were
sponsored,  financed,  and constructed  largely by nationals, in Argentina,  Europeans  were
the prime movers.  In each of these major sectors  in the three countries,  it was not locals
who saw the possibilities for technological  arbitrage, as was the case in Scandinavia,  but
those embodying the knowledge from abroad.
Just as important is the emphasis observers both present and contemporary  put on
the impact  of engineering  schools,  such  as the  Antioquia Escuela de Minas, as  critical
providers  of talent  for emerging  industry  (see,  among others,  Safford  1976).  In Brazil,
Baer (1969) argues  that despite  a tradition  of iron smelting dating from the mid-sixteenth
century,  the  techniques  used at  the end of the nineteenth  century  were  primitive.  Of the
30 ironworks  in the headwater  region of the Rio Doce  in  1879,  only seven  used Italian
forge  methods and  the rest used the  old African  cadinho (crucible)  technique.  Baer sees
the  critical  event  for  the  development  of the  native  steel  industry  as  the  foundation  in
1879 of the Escola de Minas at Ouro  Preto, Minas Gerais,  which led to the establishment
of the first new blast furnace  since the failures of the beginning  of the century. Graduates
of the  Escola de  Engenharia do  Exercito established  in  1930  would  lead  the  steel
industry as it developed through the 1960s.
Australian  observers  also  put  great  emphasis  on  the  role  of  non-university
innovation  infrastructure  in  explaining  the disparate evolution  of the  wheat  industry  in
Australia,  Canada,  and Argentina.  In  all three  countries,  wheat  had an  early  and  firm
toehold, but it became  the super staple in Canada,  largely due to government assistance  to
11prairie agriculture in the form of experiment  stations, seed testing services,  and technical
assistance.  Again,  this assistance  also came on  top of  determined  efforts in Canada and
Australia  to  achieve  widespread  literacy  in the  prairies  that have  no analogue  in Latin
America.  There  was  also  provision  of  other  important  public  goods  that  were  less
knowledge  related:  for instance,  public  granaries  and  a  wheat  grading  system provided
quality  control  that  gave  Canada  an  edge  over  Argentina's  wheat,  which  had  the
reputation for inferior quality  and lack of uniformity.25 But the provision of an extensive
institutional  and scientific  infrastructure  was recognized  as  key to Canada's  success by
contemporary  Argentines,  and  compared  poorly  with  the  lackluster  efforts  of  the
Argentine government.
Case Study 1. Convergence Clubs in Mining in Chile and Australia:
Innovation versus Adoption Equilibria, or worse?
Howitt and Mayer's  (2001)  view of multiple convergence  clubs offers insight into
the differing trajectories  followed by Chile and Australia in copper mining. Arguably,  the
initially  deficient  local  technical  capacity,  exacerbated  by  technological  progress
elsewhere,  led to  Chile's loss  of  leadership  in  copper  over  the  course  of the  last  two
centuries.  It  also  helps  explain  why  Australia's  BHP,  hailing  from  an  antipodal
dependency of similarly small size,  would discover la Escondida and be the major force
in expanding  Chilean production  in the  1980s  and  1990s.  Chile saw  its world share fall
from one-third  to under 4 percent  by  1911,  and  even  by  1884 the Sociedad de Mineria
openly  wondered  whether Chile's copper  mines  would survive  at all (Collier  and Sater
1996, p.  139). This trajectory  casts some doubt on theories that argue that market scale is
the key complementary  factor  in explaining  why  some  resource-abundant  countries, the
United  States  in particular,  became  technological  leaders(Romer  1996).  Chile  once had
the world market for copper and presumably a scale advantage.
Instead,  the  missing  complementarity  was  likely  to  be  technologically  literate
human  capital.  Collier  and  Sater  attribute  Chile's  loss  in  market  share  to  a failure  to
update  technology  in  the  face  of declining  ore  quality,  and excessive  reliance  on  the
wasteful  piriquen system.  Chilean  historians  date  this  technological  slippage  to  the
beginning  of the  nineteenth  century  when  they  note  that  there  was  little  diffusion  of
European technologies  and that "the work of mining was not very systematic"  (Villalobos
1990, p. 95). With the disappearance  of the Academy  of San Luis, there was no technical
teaching of mining in the country  and the "receipt of industrial innovations  was slow and
without visible influence"  (Villalobos  1990,  p. 96).  Charles Lambert,  representative of a
British mining company  in La Serena and trained  in the Politechnique in Paris, noted the
primitive  mining practice,  scarce knowledge  of minerals,  and inefficient  smelting,  all  of
25  As  an  illustrative  pseudo-experiment,  Fogarty  (1985)  cites  that  fact that  the  same  year  that  Spanish
Merino  sheep were introduced  into New  South Wales, Australia,  a flock was introduced  to the River Plate
region.  European  capital  was  available  for sheep  breeding  in  both  areas,  and  both  suffered  the  ups and
downs of the world wool market. In  1885,  the two countries  had the same number of sheep,  but the average
"clip"  was  getting almost twice  as much on the world market in Australia  as in Argentina,  due not only to
differences  in wool types and  quality,  but to inferior  yields per sheep.  He attributes  the differences  to the
innovation and visions of individual figures, rather than any structural features of the economy.
12which represented poor technique relative to that employed in Europe.  The Polish mining
engineer,  Ignaci  Domeyko,  in  1841  helped  establish  a  small  school,  and  in  1847  the
Universidad de Chile would  begin  to teach engineering.  But Chile was  at  this point  80
years behind the first mining school in Europe, and 50 years behind Mexico.
Chilean  historians  note  the  dominance  of  foreigners  in  applying  new
technologies26 and  Pinto  (1959,  p.71)  spectacularly  underlines  how  Chile  tragically
passed  up  the  power  that  gradual  accumulation  of  know-how  offered  to  maintain
competitiveness  and dynamism:
[T]he  technological demands  of the period,  in contrast  to what is occurring  today in
some  areas  of mining  or industry,  were  relatively  modest and  thus not too costly.
What could and had to be done in the national mining companies  and in agriculture,
except  in  certain  exceptions  ...  was  perfectly  compatible  with  the  resources
accumulated  in the  long  periods of bonanza.  If the process  had  been  initiated and
maintained adequately,  without doubt, it would  have created the  means to confront
more  challenging  tasks,  such  as  those  posed  by  copper  mining  when  it  was
necessary  to  exploit  less  rich  veins.  However,  faced  with  the  technological
revolution,  the  local  mining  companies  had  behind  them  neither  sufficient
accumulated  resources,  nor the organizational  or administrative  capacity  that  were
indispensable.  In  these  circumstances,  there  was  no  other  option  but  the
introduction  of  foreign  capital  and  expertise  at  a  cost,  without  doubt  of  a
considerable retribution.
We  can  imagine  a  bad  feedback  loop  where  inability  to innovate  leads  to  lower
profits  and  less  innovation-effective  human  capital  arising  from  experience  and hence
further inability  to innovate  or even  transfer  technology,  all of which  eventually pushes
local  entrepreneurs  out  of the  market.  Perhaps  this  accumulated  deficiency  of technical
facility  was  what  led  to  a  self-perception  that  Chileans  were  perhaps  "unfit  for  the
modem era"  (Monteon  1982  p.62).  Tancredo  Pinochet  Le-Brun,  granting that Chileans
were inferior  to Europeans, still wondered  "don't we have minds  in this country  that can
go to Europe to learn  what professors,  whom  we have  imported  and continue  importing,
have studied?  Are we truly incapable  of steering  our own  ship?"27 As mentioned  earlier,
Encina  answered  pessimistically  in  1911  for a variety of reasons,  one of which  was  the
dearth of applied  technical education  essential to progress in all fields.28 One can imagine
a sense a frustration  among concerned Chileans that the big and  visible advances  were in
26  ,It is worth  noting  that the empresarial  spirit  united  with  the motivation  to apply  new  techniques  was
almost always  the result  of initiatives of foreigner who  came to Chile and  saw opportunities  to develop  or
solutions  to problems with  practical  experience. They brought  and had  a greater tradition  of information,
spirit of action,  attention  to detail and urgency to capitalize  the on the results or resources generated,  which
was  not common trait of the  average  inhabitant  of the  country  whose  nature  of work  was  little  developed
beyond the artesanal  level"  (Villalobos . 1990 p 99).
27 Cited in Moran (1974).
28  See Encina (191 1). He  notes that "from  the point of view of capital and of technical  and  administrative
aptitude, the copper  industry is as demanding as the  most complicated  manufacturing industry" (p.  45). His
studies  reveal  "an  extraordinary  economic  ineptitude  in  the  national  population  ... consequence  of  an
education  completely  inadequate to meet the demands of contemporary life..." (p. 17).
13the Guggenheim  mines at el Teniente  and Chuquicamata,  a French steel mill "El Tofo" in
Coquimbo, and experiments  in fishing by foreign capitalists  (Monteon  1982, p. 75).
Chile would continue  to slip in its technical capacity in copper. Meller (1991  p. 44)
argues  that  "in the  1950s  one could  have  learned  more  about Chilean copper  in foreign
libraries  than  in  Chilean  ones....  [Nor]  was  there  training  of  Chilean  engineers  and
technicians  specializing  in  copper."  The  fact  that,  in  1952  the  Controller  General
admitted  that  he  had  no  idea of what went  on  in  the companies  (Moran  1974)  suggests
that part of the feeling of vulnerability  and dependency  must  be attributed to the lack of
technical capacity  to monitor and confidently critique the actions of the Gran Mineria. It
was  not  until  1955  that  a  government  agency  was  created  to  oversee  U.S.  firms'
operations  and  a  bureaucracy  of  Chilean  professionals,  engineers,  and  economists
created.  "In  short,  it  took  about  forty  years,  from  1925-1965,  to  develop  a domestic
capacity  to  analyze  the  role  of  copper  and  to  educate  Chilean  professionals  and
technicians  in the management  of the [large copper firms]"  (Meller  1991  p. 45). This is a
striking  statement  in  a  country  that  began  exporting  copper  long  before  the  U.S.  or
Australian firms that would dominate the Chilean industry. Even today, there is relatively
little  interaction  between  the  copper  companies  and universities  or  other  think  tanks.
Such a knowledge cluster, Lagos  (1997) argues, may be necessary to transform the north
into  a regional  service  center after the  inevitable  decline  in mining production  over the
next decades.
Australia's  trajectory  was  very  different.  While  most  mining  was  begun  by
Cornishmen  who  had a high  degree  of applied  skill,  in  1886 Australia  recruited  highly
paid  engineers  and  metallurgists  from  the  United  States,  and  this  firmly  linked  the
country  to U.S.-generated  innovations  (Wright  1999).  Diaz Alejandro (1985) would note
that  Australia's  mining  exports  provided  a  general  interest  in  scientific  and  technical
research  absent in Argentina.  Duncan  and Fogarty  (1984,  p.  129) argue that "geological
knowledge  and  mining  expertise  became  part  of the  Australian  heritage  enriched  by
schools  of  mines  of  world  class  and  the  industry  has  been  in  the  forefront  in  the
development and application of mining and treatment technology."  Although far ahead of
Chile,  Australia  lagged  the  United  States  (until  after  1920)  in  engineers  per  100,000
population-47 versus 128-but Australia would reach  163 per 100,000 by 1955. Several
important  universities  offer  local  beachheads  for  foreign  research.  The  Sydney
Mechanics  Institute was established  in  1843 and  the Sydney Technical  College in  1878,
both with the goal of the diffusion of scientific knowledge. The University of New South
Wales (UNSW) was founded in  1949 on the campus of the Technical  College, with MIT
and  the  Berlin  University  of Technology  as  models  and  a core  focus  on  research  and
teaching  in  science  and  technology.  The  UNSW  School  of Mining  Engineering  now
ranks as one of the largest educators of mining engineers in the world.
In this context, one of Australia's most influential mining companies and industrial
conglomerates  emerged in  1883:  Broken Hill Proprietary  Company LTD (BHP).  Called
29  http://www.mines.unsw.edu.au/school.htm;  http://unsw.edu.au/about/about_history.htmi
14by  those of the region  "the cradle of Australian  industrialization"30 Broken Hill oversaw
the  expansion  of  mines  and  smelters  and  in  1893  the  establishment  of  Australasian
Institute of Mining and Metallurgy.  When  the easily accessed oxide  zone was exhausted,
Broken  Hill  metallurgists  and  engineers  among  others  introduced  the flotation  process,
which,  as  a  residual,  allowed  the  expansion  of  zinc  production  by  new  firms.  During
WWII,  Australia,  as  the principal  member of  the Allies  in the  Pacific,  benefited  from
demand for iron-based goods and transfer of technology.  Industrial production rose by 45
percent  in the war period and technological  acquisition jumped,  a gain which  subsequent
Australian  governments  would seek to continue. BHP and similar conglomerates became
modem  corporations,  with  vertical  control  from  mining  to  blast furnaces  to  wire  rope
factories  to  shipping  lines,  and  with  links  to  foreign  capital  through  joint  ventures.
Inverting  the  traditional  center/periphery  dichotomy,  BHP  attained  a  global  reach,
acquiring mines  in the U.S. State of Utah, Canada, and Chile. Australia now exports more
in mining expertise-environmentally  friendly techniques,  mine closure methods, mineral
detection techologies- than it does wine.
30 New South Wales Department of Mineral  Resources  (2001). http://www.minerals.nsw.gov.au/silver.htm.
This section also draws on http://www.bhpbilliton.com/.
15IH. ISI as a Double Disincentive to Innovation: A Continuum of
Experiences
The  barriers  to trade  and  investment  that comprised  the  inward-looking  policies
implemented  after the Great Depression  stand as the second impediment  to the transition
to  a  innovation-based  economy,  and  offer  a rationale  for the  negative  post-1950  Latin
American  dummy  in  the  growth  regressions.  Di  Tella's  (1985)  distinction  between
entrepreneurs  being driven to appropriate the quasi-rents arising from innovations abroad
versus exploitation of artificially contrived rents is not new. But it does highlight why the
natural resources/manufacturing  debate probably  misses the point.  It is not that you have
created a manufacturing  sector, but whether you have created a source of innovation, or a
brake  on  the  dynamism  of  the  traditional  sectors  who  are  forced  to  subsidize  it.
Bl6mstrom  and  Meller  (1991b,  p.  9)  capture  much  of the  ISI critique  when  they  argue
that
When  Latin  America  decided  to  force  industrialization  by  import
substitution;  it  was  not  an  industrialization  based  on  the  countries'
endowments that was supported.  While the Scandinavian  countries slowly
and  gradually  filled  in  the  empty  slots  in  their  input-output  tables,  the
Latin  American  countries  filled  in all the  numbers at the same time;  and
even  worse,  they  tried  to  fill  in the  U.S.  numbers!  Suddenly  there  were
several  small  Latin  American  economies  with  production  structures
similar to that of the United States.
Not only  were these sectors out of line with comparative  advantage  and walled off from
competition  and  the sources  of innovation,  but they  would need  to be subsidized,  or at
least would divert attention from sectors that had the potential for innovation.
However,  Latin America's  turn inward and suspicion  of resource dependency is at
one end of a continuum that passes through Australia and Canada and then to Sweden. As
a  crude  proxy,  figures  4-6  suggest  that  virtually  all  of the  sample  countries  saw  an
increase  in average effective  tariffs  after the Great Depression.  Latin  America's average
jumps from 0.22 to 0.34 while those of our beta countries move from 0.1 to 0.16. Within
the  latter,  however,  Australia  is  as  dramatic  as  Brazil,  Mexico,  or even  Argentina,  and
even Canada could pass for Latin across much of the period.
The usual battery  of protectionist measures  appeared,  and from  observers  in these
countries  we hear exactly the critiques of inward strategies  so familiar in Latin America.
Dehem's  (1962)  cite  of the  Hirschman  quote  above  (p.  5)  about barriers  to innovation
was employed,  not in the developing  countries context,  but to explain Canada's "stunted
growth"  of the 1950s.  This theme was picked up by Stykolt and Eastman (1960) seeking
to  explain  the 30-35  percent  differential  in U.S.  and Canadian  incomes,  as  well  as  low
labor productivity.  One of the  deans  of Canadian  economic  history,  Melville  Watkins
(1963,  p.  158),  ended  one  of his  better  known  articles  by noting  the  "the  emphasis
16increasingly  placed  by  economists  on  the  link  between  the  inefficiency  of Canadian
secondary manufacturing  industry and the Canadian tariff."
Prolonged Australian protection also remains the general  culprit in most analyses of
that country's lackluster  industrial growth  in this century (Anderson  1987;  Maddock  and
McLean  1987).  Fogarty  (1985) argues  that Australia's  tariffs probably  were responsible
for  the  stagnation  of the  industrial  sector  in  the  late  1920s,  precisely  when  Argentine
manufacturing  was  growing  well.  Although  it  did  have  an  indigenous  automobile
industry  of some promise,  and BHP-type  conglomerates  with  solid roots,  Australia  and
New Zealand  would also would nurture import-substituting  industries that were neither of
efficient  scale  or  appropriate  given  comparative  advantage.  McLean  (1989,  p  22),
summarizing  the extensive Australian  literature  concludes  that ongoing protection of the
manufacturing  sector (into the  1970s)  "led to a stifling, rather than promotion  of desired
structural  change, no reduction  in the dependence  on natural  resource-intensive  exports,
and to lower growth and living standards."
Differing Reactions to a Common Dependency
That the policy of other natural-resource-abundant  countries  would parallel  that of
Latin America  is not so surprising.  Many of the factors cited  in the canonical  recounting
of the reasons for the region's turn inward are found elsewhere.
The Great Depression, the watershed period  for inward-looking policies, appears  to
have affected  the beta countries as hard as Latin America.31  Figures 7-9 and  10-12  show
that  the beta  countries  were  far more open  than  Latin America;  most were exporters  of
raw  materials and most  showed falls  in export  earnings  as large as  those seen  in Latin
America.  Latin  America  appeared  to  recover  more  slowly,  especially  Colombia  and
Brazil, which suffered  most by the fall in coffee prices, but some countries in the region,
such as Argentina,  are not distinguishable from the other sample.
Table  4  suggests  somewhat  conflicting  measures  of  actual  impact.  On  the  one
hand,  the  reported  falls  in  per  capita  output  follow  the continuum:  Latin  America  hit
hardest, then  Canada  and Australia,  and  least affected,  the  Scandinavian  countries.  Yet
the resulting  unemployment  rates,  although notoriously incomparable,  suggest that even
the  impact  on  Scandinavian  countries  was  very  high,  roughly  doubling  during  the
Depression  to  levels  between  20  and  30  percent.  Meanwhile  Argentina  remained
relatively  unscathed  at under 5.6 percent  unemployment.  Supporting evidence  suggests
that the general  picture is broadly  correct.  Aldaheff  (1985) cites the Review of the River
Plate as arguing that Argentina was one of the least-if not the least-hard hit countries
to  be found  anywhere  in  the  world,  an  impression  confirmed  by  Alejandro  Bunge,  a
prominent  industrialist,  in  1932  to  London's  Argentine  Club.32 Further,  that both  the
lower  need for "safety  net" expenditures  and the  fact that the British carried the railway
31  See Lederman  (2001)  for an excellent summary of the literature on determinants of trade liberalization.
He also argues that in the Chilean case, trade protection arose prior to the Great Depression.
32 Sodersten  (1991) testifies to the traumatic  levels in Sweden  as well.
17debt implied that Argentina would have far fewer fiscal problems than either Australia or
Canada. 3 3
At a  deeper level,  the  region's concern  with  asymmetrical  power  relations  in  the
world  economy  can  be  heard  elsewhere.  As  Love  (1996)  argued,  the  Rumanian
economist  Mihail  Manoilescu  independently  developed  a  dependency  theory  that
strikingly  parallels  that  of  Prebisch  to  explain  the  evolution  of  Central  and  Eastern
Europe.  Foreign  control  over  the  economy  emerges  as  a  theme  in  even  the  most
successful  economies.  In  1909,  80  percent  of  Norway's  mining,  85  percent  of  its
chemical,  44 percent of its paper and textile, and  33 percent of its metal  industries were
foreign-owned,  and  foreign  control  of almost  75  percent  of  all  waterfalls  essential  to
power generation  generated  widespread  protests  (Hveem  1991).  Finland's extraordinary
dependence  on Russia as a Grand Duchy and the extraordinary debt service repayments
from  1945-48, 5-6 percent  of GDP  is high by even  1980s Latin  standards  (Haavisto and
Kokko 1991). At Australia's centennial in  1880 a sizable fraction of the population,  many
the descendents of imported convict labor, expressed resentment about dependence on the
United  Kingdom. The Republican  newspaper Bulletin argued  that the convict  "chains of
iron  are  merely exchanged  for chains  of gold."  Citing the exploitative  nature of British
capital  investment,  the  editorial  argued  that  it  was  better to  be  poor  and  independent,
referring  to  Chile  and  Mexico  as  enviable  examples  (Hughes  1987,  p.  509).34  Canada
surely can share Mexico's traditional lament about being so close to the United States and
so far from God.  The percentage  of the value  of production  that  was produced  by U.S.
controlled  and affiliated companies  in  1932 ranged  from 39 percent in iron and products
to  63  percent  in  non-ferrous  metals  including  electrical  apparatus  (Marshall,  Southard,
and Taylor  1936,  cited  in  Wylie  1990).  Some observers  cited the  "satellitic"  nature  of
tariff-jumping U.S. industries as responsible for their low rate of innovation.
There  are clearly  important  differences  that are  being elided here.  But the fact  is
that  in  many  ways  these  economies  were  similar  and  they  would  react  to  perceived
dependency  in the same way Latin  America did. Wynia (1990) sees far more similarities
than  differences  in his  article  "Opening  Late-Industrializing  Economies:  Lessons  from
Argentina  and  Australia."  Analyzing  the  difficulties  of  shifting  away  from  a  "rent-
33  This  also  implied  that  fiscal  problems  during  the  Great  Depression  would  be  minor  in  Argentina
compared  with Canada or  Australia. Both  the lower demands  of supporting  the unemployed,  and  the fact
that the railways,  which ran major losses in all three countries, were  largely in private  hands in Argentina
(whereas  in  both  Canada  and  Australia  they  had  far  larger public  participation),  lessened  the  impact on
some Latin states.  Aldaheff (1985)  suggests that half of Canada's  budget deficit in  1932-33  and  1934-35
were dedicated  to financing.  Real  expenditures  between  1928-29  and  1933-34  rose 66 percent in Canada,
46 percent in Australia and only  10 percent in Argentina.  Further,  in terms of managing external debt, debt
service was calculated  at 17,  22, and 23 percent for Argentina, Australia, and Canada respectively,  and per
capita indebtedness  was  167 pesos versus 863 and 224. Argentina's repayment record  was excellent  across
the period and it was Australia,  who had overborrowed  in the  1920s, which had the  most trouble servicing
the debt. In sum, all three countries showed  conservative  and reasonable  fiscal  management  in the face of
shocks, but the Latin American entrant was relatively better off.
34  These  same  themes  would  continue  through  history  and  would  surface  over  American  ownership  of
Australian  mines  (which  had  risen to 41  percent by  1967) and  agriculture  in the  1960s and 70s.  Protests
against perceived  dependency  would  peak  in  virulent  objection  to the war in Vietnam,  and as a reaction
against Yankee Imperialism that featured prominently in the 1972 labor campaign.
18seeking"  approach,  he  sees  both economies  as  attempting  more merciful  and less  costly
industrial  revolutions,  by  relying  heavily  on  government  regulations  and  controls,  and
contrived economic rents. He is careful to note:
None of this  is confined to Latin America.  Rent-seeking  economics  is not derived
from  that  region's  patrimonial  political  traditions  or  Hispanic  affection  for
corporatist  ways  of doing politics....  Rather it was a strategy chosen by authorities
in  nations  that  were,  at  the  time  that  economic  modernization  was  accelerated,
already  too  activated  socially  and  politically  to  permit  less  politically  self-
conscious  approaches  to economic renovation.. .The  Australians  were not radically
different  from  the  Argentines  in  their  approach  to  the protection  of industry  and
labor....  They were guided  by sentiments of nationalism and nativism, stressing the
nation's  defense  against  competition  from  cheaper  labor  and/or  more  powerful
foreign economies (p. 187-188).
The  reaction  was  one  of dependent  countries  seeking  both  to  diversify  away  from  the
natural resources  that maintained the dependent relationship  and which appeared to have
taken  them down during the Great Depression.  Locating  the region  along a continuum  is
important since  it shows precisely that the Latin American countries are not rare species
operating under special economic conditions or laws, but are firmly members of the "late
modernizing  resource-rich  countries"  phylum.  They  share  similar  liabilities,  but similar
possibilities for growth.
However,  figures 4-9 also suggest some critical differences.  First, the Scandinavian
experiment  with protection  reached levels  attained by the Latin  Americans  only at their
most open periods.  Second, most of the beta countries  reduced tariffs below 0.1  by  1950.
By contrast,  the  Latin  series  are far more  volatile  and  show  no  consistent  trend  toward
decrease  through  the  end  of the  1980's.  The  average  openness  series  suggest  a similar
pattern:  the beta countries  also became  more closed in the  1930s and 1940s,  but by  1950
had retained their previous levels. Even at their most closed they were far more open than
their Latin counterparts,  which by 1989  still had not recovered  their  1895 levels.
Indeed,  the greatest departure  from the ISI trajectory  is Sweden,  which  maintained
low  tariffs  and  an  aggressive  outward  orientation  throughout  the  postwar  period.
Sweden's  labor  dynamics  are  highly  suggestive  of  the  importance  of  resolving
distributional  issues  early  and  bringing  labor onboard  to a country's  position  along  the
policy  continuum.  Hjaalmarsson  (1991),  in  "The  Scandinavian  Model  of  Industrial
Policy,"  finds the  anchor of the outward-looking  policy  in the attitude of Swedish  trade
unions  who,  "as  early  as  the  1920's  strongly  promoted  a  productivity  enhancing
industrial  policy,  emphasizing  the  rationalization  of firms"  that  placed  a  premium  on
continual  renewal  of technology,  plant  organization,  and  machinery.  He  notes  that  the
1951  policy  document  of  the  Confederation  of Trade  Unions  stressed  competition  to
increase  productivity  and  force  less  efficient  firms  out  of the  market,  combined  with
active  labor  market  policies  to  reallocate  displaced  workers.  In  the  1950s,  the
confederation  was  resolutely  free  trade,  strongly  criticized  government  protectionist
measures,  and  "argued  that  tariffs  would  decrease  productivity  growth  since  it  would
19protect  stagnating  and  less  competitive  industries."  The  importance  of  this  case  is
precisely  that it shows  that that there were  alternative  strategies  for managing  resource-
abundant economies than the one that Latin America chose.
Industrial  Drag  on Natural Resource Development
Broadly  speaking,  the same continuum  of effects  is  found  surrounding  the  second
innovation-impeding  effect of ISI:  industrialization  policies,  to a greater or lesser extent,
were implemented on the backs of the traditional  exporting sectors. Possible productivity
gains  and  growth  more  generally  were  stymied  than  encouraged  by  price  incentives.
These  disincentives  and  a  general  inattention  to  the  primary  sectors  undercut  their
dynamism.
At one extreme,  the Scandinavian  and United States cases testify to the possibilities
of sustained  development  building on resource  endowments.  Australian  observers  again
see their country  as an intermediate  case,  where  the lesser  degree  of their  turning away
from traditional  exports constitutes  the critical difference from  the Argentine case  at the
other extreme. As Australia  encouraged  investment in petroleum,  refining,  and electrical
equipment in the postwar period, it initially neglected the rural sector, which grew at only
half the  rate  of population  growth.  This  led  to  debates  about the  logic  of  stimulating
secondary  industry  in  which  the  country  had  no  comparative  advantage  and  whose
lagging  performance,  it  was  argued,  had  led  to  the  country's  periodic  balance-of-
payments  crises.  Agricultural  policy  was reversed  in  1952 with  granting  of investment
subsidies, extension  of credit, price stabilization programs, and extension of research  and
extension programs that led to a doubling of production over the next decade.
Argentina,  across  the  same  inward  looking  period  of  the  1940s-50s,  inflicted
permanent damage on its traditional leading sector, driving output  growth to .2% per year
and  leaving  the  country  perilously  close  to  ceasing  to  export  food  stuffs.  This
combination  of  inefficient  industrialization  with  the  demise  of  its  traditional  export
sectors  left  it  exceptionally  vulnerable  and  prey  to  the  cycles  of  boom  and  bust
characterizing  the region. Australia would continue  to suffer from a mild cycles of boom
and balance  of payments crises  ( and required IMF assistance  in  1952). But a rebirth of
interest  in  traditional  mining  sectors  in  the  1960s  led  to  increased  dynamism  in  the
resources  sector  that  may  lead  Australia  to  4th  in per  capita  income  in  the  near  future
despite  inattention  to the continuing  inefficiencies  of the ISI strategy  that would  not be
addressed until the 1980s.
Case Study 2: Chile Redux: Fruit  Redevivus
Lest the magnitude  of the impact of the disincentives to innovation  and  growth of
the  traditional  sectors  be  underappreciated,  it  is  worth  going into  some detail  again  on
one case,  resource exports  in  Chile, and  particularly  fruit.  Chile  aggressively undertook
the  public  good  and  pro-innovation  policies  found  in  the  successful  natural  resource
exporters,  but would find them undermined  by policies  toward the industrial  sector.  The
Promethean efforts  of the state development  corporation (CORFO),  founded in 1939 and
20growing to  control  30 percent of total investment,  laid  the foundations  for the dynamic
export  industries  of the next  half-century.  Similar to  what Wright  (1999) documents  in
the  United  States  case,  CORFO  financed  and  promoted  prospecting  for  gold,  silver,
manganese,  and  iron.  To  develop  the  fishing  industry,  CORFO  contracted  technical
assistance  missions, established a marine biology station near Valparafso in  1945, granted
sizable  tax  exemptions  in  1952,  and  joined  the  army  and  the  University  of  Chile  in
surveying  the coastal  waters  in  1954.  It  took  the  first  inventories  of forest  stocks,  and
contracted  the  1944 Haig  technical  assistance  mission to examine  the forestry sector.  In
1953  it financed  processing  plants  for cellulose  and  newsprint.  In  the  fruit  industry  as
well, CORFO financed technical  assistance missions,  extended credit for cultivation  and
experimental  plots,  and  invested  in  supporting  infrastructure,  and  in  1941  it  financed
efforts  to promote exports  of wood products  and wine.  Throughout  the  1950s  and early
1960s  CORFO  established  an  experimental  fishing  station  in.  Arauco,  financed
construction  of modem  boats and  dock  facilities  in  Tarapaca  and  Valivia,  and founded
fish  canneries  and  fishmeal  mills.  The  World  Bank-financed  Paper  and  Carton
Manufacturing  Company  in  Bio-Bio  stimulated  paper  and  cellulose-related  forestry
activities  after  1957.  There  appears  no  want  of state  support  for the  fledgling  resource
sectors.
However,  the  overall  context  of incentives  worked  against  them.  CORFO  may
have been correct in boasting on its twentieth birthday of Chilean history being divided in
two eras:  that before  the construction of the Huachipato  iron  works near Concepci6n  in
1947  and  that  after  which  transformed  the  region  into  an  important  center  of
manufacturing.  But  early  on  local  observers  wondered  at  the  costs.  A  compilation  of
seminars given in the business community  in 1954 entitled Negative Aspects of Economic
Intervention: Failures of an Experiment praised CORFO's  irreplaceable  role in creating
the electricity  and fishing industries, but derided the gross inefficiency  of Huachipato  and
the National  Petroleum  company and saw  the capriciousness  of exchange  controls  as the
overriding disincentive to needed foreign investment.  The halving of export volume over
the  previous  decade,  the  stagnation  of  agriculture,  and  the  frustration  of  Chile's
tremendous  potential  in  vegetable  and  fruit  exports  were  laid  at  the  feet  of irrational
intervention  in  the  price  mechanisms  and  the  persistently  overvalued  exchange  rate
(Correa Prieto 1954 cited in Maloney 1997).
In the 1960s, recurrent  balance-of-payments  crises would lead the Christian Democratic
Government of Eduardo Frei in Chile to seek to promote nontraditional  and traditional
exports. Yet Chile's areas of natural comparative  advantage  were stymied  by the gross
protection and inefficiencies  that were the logical culmination of a system of protection
and incentives that had mutated into literally incomprehensible degrees of distortion.
Jeanneret  (1972, p 95), a researcher at the Centro de Estudios  de Planificacion  Nacional
at the Universidad  Catolica  (CEPLAN),  noted that in  1965, "the multiplicity of
instruments used,  and the frequency with which they were modified,  had arrived at such
extremes that it was humanly impossible to have a clear vision of their final impact by
sector or for the economy  as a whole."  She found effective rates of protection  extreme
by global standards, ranging from -100 to 650 compared to -50 to 500 for Brazil, -25 to
200 for Malaysia, and -17 to 106 for Norway. These heavy negative rates of protection
21implied that 10 of 21 industries studied could export only at a loss and that "some of
these sectors, principally  wood, paper, paper products, fish and other minerals, would
have become, perhaps, significant exporters."  A contemporary observer, Marko
Mamalakis, also wondered at the inability of the agro-export industry to grow, given that
"export demand for raw or processed Chilean fruit, seafood,  oils, wine and so forth [was]
almost unlimited" (Mamalakis  1976, p151).
That  these  disincentives  to  invest  and  innovate  were  critical  is  borne  out  by
subsequent history. As is well known, the history of the Chilean economy since 1975 has
been one of relentless pursuit of integration  with the world  economy and a correction  of
the  distortions  accumulated  in  the  previous  decades.  In  the  next  20 years,  non-copper
exports  increased  by  a  factor  of  10,  essentially  eliminating  the  traditional  foreign
exchange  bottleneck  to  industry.  The  most dramatic  story,  however,  occurs  in the  fruit
sector,  where  exports  grew at a rate of 20 percent annually  in the first 20 years  after the
reforms  of  1974.  Areas  planted  to  commercial  orchard  almost  tripled,  and  fruit
production  and the number of entrepreneurs  quadrupled.
Jarvis (1992)  attributes this success  to the rapidity  with  which Chileans  were  able
to  transfer,  adapt,  and  extend  fruit  technologies  initially  developed  for  California  and
other fruit-growing  regions  to Chile.  CORFO  again had played  an  important  role in the
early  1960s  in  laying  the  foundations  for this boom,35 as  did  the ten-year  program  for
cooperation  with the University  of California  and the University of Chile, established  in
1965  to  permit  technical  cooperation  and  improve  graduate  training.  This  helped  the
University  of Chile  to  develop  first-rate  faculty  in  fruit-related  sciences  and  to  begin
modern  fruit  research.  But  Jarvis  is  also  clear  that  most  of  the  post-liberalization
initiatives  in  these  areas  were  privately  funded  and  driven  by  changes  in  price
relationships  and industry  structure  that increased  returns  to private R&D.  Further down
the  innovation  chain,  the number of university  theses on fruit submitted  in Agricultural
Engineering  from  1976-80  to  1986-90  increased  by  a  factor  of  2.5.  Though  Jarvis
expresses concern  that private provision of a non-excludable  good might  not be as likely
as  profits  to  the  industry  are  eroded,  there  can  be  no  question  that  the  story  of  the
renaissance  of Chilean  fruit is one of innovation  made  profitable by eliminating  a  bias
against the sector.
35CORFO's  interventions  included analysis  of potential  demand;  establishing  a in surveying  existing  fruit
orchards; analysis  of potential  demand in foreign markets; elaboration of production goals;  introduction and
screening of new varieties;  establishment of nurseries to propagate disease-free plants; construction of cold-
storage facilities  at strategic  locations  to promote post-harvest  care; phytosanitary  inspection  of exported
fruit; and establishment of favorable  credit lines  and working capital,  as well  as "drawback"  payments for
fruit exports.  In  1964  Chile establish  the National  Institute  of Agricultural  Research  (INIA)  which  paid
relatively  higher salaries and attracted  more skilled researchers,  and INIA initiated  a fruit research program.
By these means,  Chile developed the scientific  personnel and knowledge to achieve technological  transfer;
identified and  began to plant new varieties suitable  for foreign  markets; improved orchard and post-harvest
management;  upgraded  fruit research  and  teaching;  and developed  the infrastructure  necessary  to export
fruit to foreign markets.  Several export companies emerged that gained experience  with foreign markets.
22In Conclusion
The logical question is why Latin America  occupies  the extreme  of the continuum
sketched  here.  Though  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper,  much  of the  explanation  lies in
political  and  economic  dynamics-timing  of  the  mobilization  of  urban  classes,
modernization of the rural areas, the form of integrating new actors into traditional power
structures,  and  so  forth-and  these  dynamics  receive  attention,  particularly  among
Australian  observers.  Further, if the data in table 4 are to be trusted, Latin America  may
have suffered  a greater fall in income.
However,  in  keeping  with  the  general  focus  on  national  learning  capacity  and
adoption of knowledge from abroad, three ideas suggest themselves:
First, the necessary  degree of protection  to preserve or jumpstart industries  is likely
to  be  a  function  of their  ability  to  innovate  as  fast  as  their  foreign  competitors.  The
Swedish forestry  industry does not seek protection from Brazilian and Chilean exporters.
But  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  nineteenth-century  Brazilian  iron  smelters  using
archaic  cadinho technologies  complained  of competition  from  more  modern  producers
abroad, despite the high shipping costs. A lower  national learning capacity would dictate
higher necessary  levels of protection  to have a comparable stimulative effect.
Second,  the  same  deficiency  in  national  learning  capacity  may  have  implied
reliance  on  technological  from  foreign  actors,  which  conferred  a  greater  sense  of
dependency and additional  suspicion of natural  resources.  It is likely that had Chile had
the capacity to monitor the Gran Mineria in the  1950s, it would have enjoyed a stronger
bargaining  position, a greater confidence in copper as continuing growth  industry,  a less
distortive experiment  with ISI, and potentially  less divisive politics. Together,  two these
factors  suggest  that Latin  America's  poor post-war  performance,  and  extreme  inward
looking  policies that contributed to it, reflect the cumulative impact  of deficiencies  with
very deep historical roots.
Finally,  innovation  in  economic  knowledge  may  depend  on  the  same  factors.
Between  low  levels of general  literacy  and  the  same  weakness  in tapping  into  foreign
advances,  Latin  America  may  have  been  less  familiar  with  the  laws of economics  and
sound  management  than  the  beta  countries.  Duncan  and  Fogerty  (1984)  argue  that
Australia  emerged  from  its  traumatic  period  of  Depression  unemployment  with  a
renewed commitment to economic management  and state intervention. But it retained the
professionals  from  business  and  the  universities  who  had  successfully  managed  war
production  and  directed  them  toward  maintaining  postwar  prosperity.  There  was  a
fundamental  belief in the  need  for a technically  sound basis  for economic  management
and  a  commitment  to  remaining  engaged  in  the  world  economy.  In  Sweden,  Jonung
(1992) notes how unusually involved professors of economics  were and remain in public
life.  Globally  renowned  figures  such  Cassel,  Heckscher,  Ohlin,  and  Wicksell  were
frequent  government  advisors,  promoters  of public debate,  and  even  parliamentarians.
But this was the same era when Peron dismissed tecnicos like Raul Prebisch, arguing that
23"there  can  be  nothing  more  elastic  than  the  economy"  and  that  economists'  alarmist
warnings  should be  ignored.  The  latter  suggests  that this point  should  probably  not be
overstressed.  Often in Latin American history, the macro-basics are firmly understood  by
key  actors,  but  the  political  circumstances  overrode  their  advice.  Nonetheless,  it  is
remarkable  to  hear  many  of the  current  Latin  American  leaders,  in the  face  of  vast
international  evidence,  again  recurring to policies  that will  guarantee  that over the  long
run the region will remain  far from the innovation frontier.
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33TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Variables:
Initial Level  of Income: For the Maddison dataset, GDP per capita was  calculated using
the  average  growth  rates  per period  and the  GDP per  capita (GDPpc)  of 1989 in  1995
constant US$.  In  order to control  for different  convergence  across periods,  the  variable
was calculated relative to the maximum GDPpc  in the period. Thus: Initial GDPpc = Max
(log GDPpc  in  t)  - log  GDPpc  in t.  For  Sachs  and  Warner  we use  the  their  variable
LGDPEA70.
Net Primary Exports per Worker:
Leamer (1995) measure of Natural Resources:  the sum of the exports minus imports
of the categories divided by number of workers:
1.  Petroleum and Derivatives (SITC 33)
2.  Raw Materials (SITC 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, and 68)
3.  Forest Products (SITC 24, 25, 63, and 64)
4.  Tropical Agriculture (SITC 5, 6, 7,  11, and 23)
5.  Animal Products (SITC 0 to 3, 21,  29, 43, and 94)
6.  Cereals, Oil, Textile Fibers, Tobacco  and others (SITC 4, 8,  9, 12, 22, 26, 41, and
42) divided by total labor force. Data was taken from the database used for de
Ferranti and others (2002).
Openness:  This variable was taken from Sachs and Warner (1995).  It contains  a dummy
per country and year indicating if the country was open or not.
Investment:  For  the  Maddison  database,  it  is  the  average  of  Gross  Domestic  Fixed
Investment  / GDP.  It is taken from Nehru and Dhareshwa Physical Capital  Stock dataset
(World Bank). For Sachs and Warner we use their variable LINV7089.
Knowledge  Index:  The  index  was  taken  from the  database used  for Lederman  and  Xu
(2001)  and de Ferranti  and others (2002).  It was constructed using R&D expenditures  as
a share of GNP; persons in R&D per million people, patent applications by residents and
nonresidents  as  share  of worldwide  patents  applications;  and  patent applications  in the
United  States by origin of the applicant as share of total patent applications  in the United
States.  Missing  values  were  imputed  using  factor  analysis  with  regional  and  yearly
dummies, GDP per capita, and general level of education.
34Table 1. Rates of Growth of GDP per Capita, 1820-89
(Annual average compound  rate of growth)
1820-70  1870-1913  1913-50  1950-73  1973-89
The European  capitalist core and its offshoots
Austria  0.6  1.5  0.2  4.9  2.3
Belgium  1.4  1.0  0.7  3.5  2 0
Denmark  0.9  1.6  1.5  3.1  1.7
Finland  0.8  1.4  1.9  4.3  2.8
France  0.8  1.3  1.1  4.0  1.9
Germany  0.7  1.6  0.7  5.0  1.9
Italy  0.4  1.3  0.8  5.0  2.6
Netherlands  0.9  1.0  1.1  3 4  1.3
Norway  0.7  1.3  2.1  3.2  3.1
Sweden  0.7  1.5  2.1  3.1  1.7
United Kingdom  1.2  1.0  0.8  2.5  1.9
Australia  1.9  0.9  0.7  2.4  1.7
Canada  2.3  1.5  2.9  2.4
United States  1.2  1.8  1.6  2.2  1.6
Average  0.9  1.4  1.2  3.5  2.1
European  periphery
Czechoslovakia  0.6  1.4  1.4  3.1  1.3
Greece  0.5  6.2  1.7
Hungary  1.2  1.2  3.5  1.2
Ireland  0.7  3.1  2.9
Portugal  0.3  1.4  5.6  1.7
Spain  0.6  1.4  0.2  5.1  1.8
Soviet  Union  0.8  2.3  3.6  1.0
Average  0.6  1.0  1.1  4.3  1.7
Latin America
Argentina  1.9  0.7  2.1  -1.2
Brazil  0.2  0.3  2.0  3.8  1.7
Chile  1.7  1.2  1.5
Colombia  1.5  2.1  1.8
Mexico  0.4  1.1  1.0  3.1  1.0
Peru  1.4  2.5  -1.2
Average  0.3  1.1  1.4  2.5  0.6
Asia
Bangladesh  -0.3  -0.7  2.2
China  0 0  0.3  -0.5  3.7  5.7
India  0.0  0.3  -0.3  1.6  2.7
Indonesia  0.2  0.5  -0.2  2.1  3.4
Japan  0.1  1.4  0.9  8.0  3.0
Korea  -0.2  5.2  6.4
Pakistan  -0.3  1.8  2.8
Taiwan  0.4  6.2  6.1
Thailand  0.4  0.0  3.2  5.2
Average  0.1  0.6  -0.1  3.5  4.2
Source: Maddison  (1994).
35Table 2a. Growth Correlates: Maddison Data, 1820-1989
Growth Summary Regressions  Period
1820-1989  1820-1950  1950-1989
a  b  a  b  a  b
-0.265-  -. 265  -0.51--  - 52-  -0.19  -0.206 convergence meure (1)  -(2.25)  -(2.26)  -(5.31)  -(5 44)  -(1.05)  -(1.15)
Net Pnmary Exports per Worker  -0.076  -0.048  0.107*  0.090  -0.34'  -0.270 Net Pnmary  Exports  per Worker  J9(0.75  4046  (1.89)  (1.56)  -(1.64)  -(.3)
Latin Ameica  -0.38  0.23  -0.86-
-(1.29)  (1.30)  -(1  64)
1870-1913  0.612  0.618  0.721-  0.722
(1.54)  (1 56)  (4.16)  (4.19)
1913-1950  0.406  0.434  .528"  0.517
(1.09)  (1.16)  (3.22)  (3.16)
1950-1973  2.64--  2.66^  1.43-  1.43"-
(7.00)  (7.07)_  (3.72)  (3.78)
1973-1989  1.19"-  1.21"  -
(3.22)  (3.28)
Constant  0.82  0.857--  .935"  .92--  1.96  2.11
.69)  (2.80)  (6.73)  (6  63)  (5.25)  (5.55)
Obs.  147  147  73  73  74  74
R-squared  0.35  0.36  0.38  0.40  0.19  0.22
(t-student values)
Note:  *  Significant at 10% level; "Significant  at 5%  level. (1)  Difference In  GDP per capita to the most advanced country. (rr
Source: Authors construction  using Maddison (1995)  and WDI
I
Table 2b. Growth Correlates including Measures of Openness, Knowledge,
Maddison and Sachs, and Warner Data
Dep.var.:  Average Annual Growth Rate  1  a  1 b  2a  2b
Initial  Level of Income (1)  -0.215  0.975  0.335  -1.284^ Initial Level of Income  (1)  -(1.17)  (3.31)  (1.62)  -(4.78)
Net Primary  Exports per Worker  -(1.26)  -(0.46)  -0.259  0.106
Latin America  -0.890  ^  0.703  -1.483  -0.547
-(1.67)  (1.29)  -(3.30)  -(1.35)
1950-1973  1.411  ^*  1.908  ^^
(3.61)  (5.21)
Openness  2.203  ^  2.140 ^'
(3.46)  (4.74)
Investment  5.848  ^  1.224
(1.71)  (5.06)
Knowledge Index (2)  0.390  ^  0.184  '
(3.24)  (1.68)
Constant  2.149  ^  -3.009  ^  -1.375  7.848"
(5.47)  -(2.85)  -(0.80)  (3.70)
Obs.  72  72  91  91
R-squared  0.22  0.47  0.15  0.57
(t-student values)
Note:  * Significant at  10% level; ^* Significant at 5% level. la and 2b use Maddison(1 995) database.  2a and
2b use Sachs and Wamer (1997) (1) for la and lb relative to the maximum  GDP per capita of each period.
(2) Missing values were imputed using factor analysis (See Technical Appendix)
36Table 3. Density  of Engineers at the Turn of the
Twentieth Century
Engineers  per
Country  Year  100,000 workers
Australia  1920  47
Chile  1930  6
Colombia  1887  8
Sweden  1890  84
United States  1920  128
Source. Colombia.  Safford (1976), Chile  Villalobos (1990),
Australia, United States: Meredith  (1995), Sweden:  Ahlstr6m(1992).
Elaborated by Author.
Table 4. Impact of the Great Depression  (Percent)
Changes in terms oj
trade of  Max. negative
commodities  change in GDP
Country  exports 1928-1932  Max.  unemployment  compared  with 1929
gentina  -45.0  5.6/7  -14.0
razil  -61.1  -6.0
Chle  -45.6  7.0  -27.0
olombia  -56.5  -2.0
Mxico  -51.5  6.0  -17.6
ustralia  -51.5  20.0  -9.7
Canada  -58.3  19.0  -25.1
Deunmark  ____________  32.0  positive
Finland  -46.3  -4.0
Norwav  -38.0  33.0  -2.6
Sweden  -55  24.0  -4.0
Source: Mitchell  (1998a,  1998b,  1998c) and Sadie (1969).
Elaborated  by Author.
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